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POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO DNA TESTING:
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OFFER
AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION, LEAVING THE STATES
TO REMEDY THE SITUATION
David A. Schumacher+
"Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream." Judge Learned Hand wrote these words in
an attempt to dispel concerns about the possibility of wrongful convictions. 2 In
recent decades the availability of post-conviction DNA testing has revealed
that wrongful convictions are indeed a very real problem in the American legal
system. 3 Since 1988, more than two hundred wrongfully convicted Americans
have been exonerated by demonstrating their innocence through post-
conviction DNA testing.4 This number is a testament to the fact that innocent
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2003, University of Virginia. The author wishes to thank his wonderful wife, Kathryn, for
her support, all of his family for their encouragement, Professor J.P. Ogilvy and Jason Derr for
their insight, and the entire Catholic University Law Review staff and board for their assistance.
1. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
2. See Chet Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 373, 411 (2005).
3. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 527 (2005) ("The number of DNA exonerations has increased
across this period, from one or two a year in 1989 to 1991, to an average of six a year from 1992
through 1995, to an average of twenty a year since 2000."); see also 150 CONG. REC. H8179,
8189 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) ("[T]he criminal justice system is
about the search for the truth, and like all human enterprises, it is fallible. Judges and jurors and
police, eye witnesses, defense counsel and prosecutors are all human beings and all make
mistakes. I served as a prosecutor for some 20 years. I made mistakes, and those mistakes are
etched forever in my mind. But we have the means now at our disposal [i.e., DNA testing] to
minimize the possibility of error, and especially where lives are at stake, we have no choice, we
have no option, we must take advantage of them.").
4. See The Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008); see also Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA
Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) ("In recent times, no development has
transformed the practice of criminal justice as much as DNA evidence. In little over fifteen years,
DNA profiling has produced nothing short of a paradigm shift." (footnote omitted)); Jennifer
Boemer, Student Article, In the Interest of Justice: Granting Post-Conviction Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1971, 1976 (2001) ("When DNA
testing was introduced to the criminal justice scene, prosecutors saw it as a powerful tool to assist
in the conviction and incarceration of the guilty. Over the last few years, DNA analysis has
become a powerful tool to the defense to exonerate those who have already been convicted.
Using DNA testing at the post-conviction stage is a controversial issue that raises both procedural
and substantive questions."); Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-
conviction Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 589-90 (2004) ("DNA testing,
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people have been convicted in the past and may continue to be convicted
5today. Despite growing public awareness and recent federal legislation, many
inmates continue to face an almost insurmountable uphill climb in their
attempts to gain access to evidence for DNA testing.6 The problem is that the
two primary means of challenging wrongful convictions are inadequate and do
not allow inmates the access they need to physical evidence in order to prove
their innocence.
Currently, federal law provides two options for inmates who seek to
challenge their convictions with DNA evidence. The first option to gain access
to evidence for use in DNA testing is for the inmate to establish a cause of
7
action under § 1983. Section 1983 "gives a cause of action for anyone
subjected 'to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws' by a person acting under color of state law."8 The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether post-conviction claims are
cognizable under § 1983, and the federal circuit courts of appeals are split on
regardless of the form, yields one of three results: exclusion, meaning that the individual is not
the source of the material tested; non-exclusion, meaning that the individual cannot be excluded
as the source; or no result, meaning that the analysis cannot be completed. Exclusion is a
definitive finding, but non-exclusion moves the inquiry into a statistical analysis to determine the
probability that the individual is the source of the material. The power-that is, the degree of
reliability and accuracy-of the statistical calculation varies depending on the type of DNA test
performed. The most recent test, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), requires much smaller
quantities of source material, can use a wider variety of material, and tends to be more successful
in analyzing materials from rape cases. In criminal proceedings, the plaintiff hopes to use
retesting to find and develop exculpatory evidence, build a case for innocence, and, finally, secure
release from custody." (internal citations omitted)); Courttv.com, First for a Woman: DNA Frees
Mother Convicted of Killing Daughter, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.courttv.com/news/2007/
1129/dejac-ctv.html ("A judge's decision [on Nov. 28, 2007] to vacate the verdict and order a
new trial made [Lynn DeJac] the first woman in the U.S. to have a murder conviction overturned
on the basis of DNA evidence."); Human Genome Project Information, DNA Forensics,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/elsi/forensics.shtml (last visited Aug. 18,
2008) (explaining in detail DNA testing and how it is done for those unfamiliar with the process).
5. See Gross, supra note 3, at 542 ("One way to think of false convictions is as a species of
accidents. Like many accidents, they are caused by a mix of carelessness, misconduct, and bad
luck."); see also Hon. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual
Innocence, 57 ME. L. REv. 481, 517 (2005) (The article argues that United States courts currently
face "a time in our legal history when there is no cause to be smug that the Anglo-Saxon criminal
trial as we know it unerringly reaches the correct result. On the contrary, as the exoneration
studies show, the outcome of the American criminal trial is often fatally wrong.").
6. See Dylan Ruga, Comments, Federal Court Adjudication of State Prisoner Claims for
Post-Conviction DNA Testing: A Bifurcated Approach, 2 PIERCE L. REv. 35, 35-36 (2004).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
8. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1218
(2008).
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the matter. 9 The Fourth,1° Fifth," and Sixth12 Circuit Courts of Appeals have
all held that an inmate seeking to challenge a conviction through DNA
evidence does not have a cognizable claim because a § 1983 lawsuit amounts
to a direct attack on the legitimacy of the conviction.
13
Four other circuits have gone the opposite way.' 4 The Second,
15 Seventh,' 6
Ninth, 17 and Eleventh 18 Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as district courts
residing in two circuits that have yet to speak on this issue, 19 have held that
while an inmate has a cognizable claim for access to DNA testing under §
1983, the process for release must still be found in a subsequent habeas corpus
lawsuit.
2 °
The case of Johnnie Lee Savory II illustrates the shortcomings of § 1983.21
When James Robinson and Connie Cooper were killed in Peoria, Illinois, in
1977, Savory was charged with their murder.22 Though only fourteen at the
time, Savory was convicted, but the conviction was overturned on appeal
23because of an involuntary confession introduced at trial. The State of Illinois
9. See Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340, 340-41 (6th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery
County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002).
But see McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103; Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 2433 (2007); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d
1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005), remanded to 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (D. Alaska 2006), aff'd, 521 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008) (No. 08-6); Bradley v.
Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11 th Cir. 2002).
10. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375.
11. See Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340.
12. See Boyle, 46 F. App'x at 340-41.
13. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 378. The fact that Harvey, the inmate, was attempting to "use
his [§ 1983] claim for access to evidence to set the stage for a future attack on his confinement"
was unacceptable to that court. Id.
14. See McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103; Savory, 469 F.3d at 672; Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1054;
Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1290.
15. See McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103.
16. See Savory, 469 F.3d at 672.
17. See Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1054.
18. See Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1290.
19. See Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237-38 (D. Mass. 2006); Derrickson v. Del.
County Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 04-1569, 2006 WL 2135854, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. July 26,
2006).
20. See Savory, 469 F.3d at 672; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (describing the
requirements of a habeas corpus petition).
21. See Savory, 469 F.3d at 667.
22. Id. at 669.
23. People v. Savory, 403 N.E.2d 118, 124 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980); see also Margaret A.
Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal Justice System, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs
320, 323 (2006) ("[W]e know that false confessions were made in quite a few of the [exoneration]
cases, and we know that the police have many techniques for eliciting confessions. Indeed the
Supreme Court in 2004 in Missouri v. Seibert noted various techniques the police had developed
and disseminated in training manuals for evading the prophylactic effect Miranda warnings were
1247
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24
retried Savory in 1981 and he was again convicted. During the second trial,
the State offered physical evidence against Savory, including hair similar to
his, a bloody knife found in his home, and pants Savory "may have worn
bearing a bloodstain of the same type as the female victim's blood. 25
Following that conviction, Savory sought relief numerous times through state
and federal courts, culminating in the filing of a § 1983 lawsuit in April
2005. 26 Despite the court's decision that Savory's suit was cognizable under §
1983,27 he nevertheless lost his case because his claims were not timely filed.28
Though § 1983 could have helped a potentially innocent man, it was
inadequate in the Savory case.
The second option for post-conviction DNA testing is for an inmate to bring
an action under the Justice for All Act of 2004 (JFAA).29 The JFAA was
intended to address some of the inadequacies of current methods of access to
physical evidence. 30  Section 3600, known as the Innocence Protection Act
(IPA), is the main element of the JFAA dealing with post-conviction DNA
testing.3  Specifically, § 3600 permits an inmate to challenge a conviction
through DNA evidence if the individual can satisfy the elements prescribed by
the IPA.32 Senator Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
one of the main proponents of the JFAA, explained that one of the central
purposes of the IPA was to "reduce the risk that innocent persons may be
executed" and "[e]nsure that convicted offenders are afforded an opportunity to
proved their innocence through DNA testing .... " 33 While § 3600 was meant
to address many of the difficulties created by the wrongful execution of
supposed to have on false confessions. And given the huge advantages that suspects may gain by
pleading guilty, such as avoiding the death penalty, it is remarkably harsh to bar them from post-
conviction DNA testing, particularly as many had probably never heard of DNA, or, if they had,
did not comprehend at the time they pled that DNA evidence could prove innocence." (footnotes
omitted)).
24. Savory, 469 F.3d at 669.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 672.
28. Id. at 675. Cf David DeFoore, Comment, Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for
Justice From the Wrongly Convicted, 33 TEX. TECH L. REv. 491, 503 (2002) ("Although there
have been many recent changes in the law regarding postconviction DNA testing and
admissibility, it has normally been difficult, under both federal and state law, to obtain
postconviction DNA testing because of time limits on motions for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence.").
29. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended
in scattered section of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
30. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 2006).
32. Id.
33. Sen. Leahy, Major Issues - Innocence Protection Act, http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/
ipa/index.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008)
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innocent people,34 § 3600 itself is both confusing in the way it is written35 and
unwieldy in practice.
36
Since its passage, the IPA has often failed to provide inmates the oPortunity
to prove their innocence, as witnessed in the case of Danny Boose. Boose
was accused of kidnapping and raping a woman on July 4, 1995. 38 Prior to
trial, DNA taken from pants found in Boose's house was compared to a DNA
sample taken from Boose. 39 The FBI concluded that the samples contained
Boose's DNA and that it was Boose's semen found on the pants.4 ° The test
results bolstered the claims of an eyewitness and ten others who testified that
they either saw Boose commit one of the acts or heard him talk about the
crimes afterward. 41 Though Boose continuously professed his innocence, he
was not able to obtain relief through re-testing under the too-numerous
requirements of § 3600.42
This Comment argues that neither § 1983 nor the IPA provide inmates an
adequate opportunity to obtain post-conviction DNA testing. In Part I, this
Comment explores the basis for the current circuit split over § 1983 lawsuits.
Part II then examines the inadequacies of the IPA, in which Congress
attempted to address the post-conviction conundrum. Part III next analyzes
why three of the circuits have erred in denying § 1983 actions in light of
Supreme Court precedent and points out how the Court must correct those
circuits in the future. This Part also analyzes the deeper problems § 1983
cannot solve, as demonstrated by the case of Johnnie Lee Savory II. This
Comment will then argue that the IPA's overly strict nature causes it to fall
short of the potential hoped for by innocence proponents and lawmakers.
Finally, Part IV proposes that model legislation is necessary to prevent
wrongful executions and the prolonged imprisonment of the innocent by
allowing them to DNA-test their evidence.
34. See id. (The Senator stated that one of the most important features of the legislation was
"[e]nsur[ing] that convicted offenders are afforded an opportunity to prove their innocence
through DNA testing .... ").
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a). Subpart (a) of § 3600 contains no less than ten
requirements an inmate must meet in order to access his physical evidence for testing. Id.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890-92 (N.D. Miss. 2007)
(denying plaintiff's § 3600 claim because he failed to satisfy four of the ten requirements of §
3600 (a)).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 888.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 888-89.
41. Id. at 889.
42. Id. at 890-92.
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I. FROM PREISER TO DERRICKSON: DEVELOPING THE FAIR USE OF § 1983
A. What § 1983 Requires of a Litigant and its Early Limitations
Any person who alleges a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law
may file a § 1983 lawsuit.43 A complainant must make two specific allegations
in order to establish a valid § 1983 lawsuit.44 First, the plaintiff must allege
that the defendant deprived him of a federal constitutional right.45 Second, the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.4 6 The
Supreme Court has commented that § 1983 should be interpreted broadly to
further its purpose as remedial legislation.
47
Initially, courts struggled to decide how § 1983 should be handled in relation
to habeas corpus lawsuits. In 1973, the Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision, Preiser v. Rodriguez, concluding that § 1983 cannot be used to
question confinement. 48 In Preiser, state prison inmates filed § 1983 claims to
obtain the restoration of time they had accrued for good behavior (good-time
credit).49 The Court held that state prisoners could not challenge the fact or
duration of their confinement under § 1983 because only habeas corpus could
be used for that purpose. 50  Preiser reached this conclusion based on the
Court's view that Congress established habeas corpus as the "appropriate
remedy" in such situations. 51 Furthermore, the Court noted that § 1983 cannot
be used as an end-run around the habeas corpus exhaustion requirements
because Congress specifically passed habeas legislation mandating
exhaustion.
52
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.").
44. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 639.
48. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
49. Id. at481.
50. Id. at 490.
51. Id. ("In short, Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for
state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific
determination must override the general terms of § 1983.").
52. Id. at 489.
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The Supreme Court expanded upon Preiser and the use of § 1983 in Heck v.
Humphrey, decided in 1994.53 In that case, the plaintiff sought compensatory
and punitive damages for a conviction he claimed was obtained illegally.
The Court held that a state prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 claim that "would
necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiffs] conviction or sentence"
even if the plaintiff was not seeking release from prison.55  The Court
emphasized that the only way a prisoner could challenge the fact or duration of
his confinement, directly or indirectly, was through habeas corpus.
56
B. How Three Circuit Courts of Appeals Used Preiser and Heck to Deny §
1983 Lawsuits Seeking Post-Conviction DNA Testing
In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions in Preiser and Heck, the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have each ruled that inmates may not bring § 1983
lawsuits in order to compel DNA testing.57 The earliest of these decisions was
Harvey v. Horan, in which the Fourth Circuit decided to bar the use of § 1983
if the inmate's true desire in the lawsuit was a future attack on his
incarceration. 58 Two other circuits soon fell in line.
In Kutzner v. Montgomery County, the Fifth Circuit reviewed an inmate's
claim that prosecutors had refused to release physical evidence for DNA
testing that might have led to his exculpation.59 Kutzner, like Harvey, held that
53. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1994); see also Eric J. Savoy, Heck v.
Humphrey: What Should State Prisoners Use When Seeking Damages From State Officials...
Section 1983 or Federal Habeas Corpus?, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109,
138 (1996) ("[T]he anticipated Supreme Court case [i.e., Heck] has made a complex area of the
law even more complicated."). Instead of simply applying the holding from Preiser, the Court
offered an alternative rationale. Id.
54. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479 ("The complaint alleged that respondents, acting under color of
state law, had engaged in an 'unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation' leading to
petitioner's arrest; 'knowingly destroyed' evidence 'which was exculpatory in nature and could
have proved [petitioner's] innocence'; and caused 'an illegal and unlawful voice identification
procedure' to be used at petitioner's trial. App. 5-6. The complaint sought, among other things,
compensatory and punitive monetary damages. It did not ask for injunctive relief, and petitioner
has not sought release from custody in this action." (alteration in original)).
55. Id. at 487.
56. Id. at 481; see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490.
57. See Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340, 340-41 (6th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery
County, 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2002); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2002).
58. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 378. According to the court, Harvey wanted to "use his [§ 1983]
claim for access to evidence to set the stage for a future attack on his confinement. Therefore, his
claim is effectively a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Id The court would not allow Harvey
to do any such thing. Id.
59. Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340. It is not uncommon for exonerated prisoners to accuse
prosecutors of having acted poorly. In one recent case, however, the prosecutor struck back by
suing a freed inmate who wrote a book about his experience for libel. See
TheKansasCityChannel.com, KC Man Wrongly Imprisoned Sued By Prosecutor, Oct. 3, 2007,
http://www.kmbc.com/news/14258640/detail.html?taf-kcl. But see Judith A. Goldberg & David
M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of
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the inmate was precluded from bringing a § 1983 claim to compel DNA testing
under precedent set by Heck. 60 The court concluded that the plaintiffs claim
was really a habeas corpus petition and, therefore, he could not succeed by
61disguising his case as something else under § 1983.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in Boyle
v. Mayer.62 There, the court dismissed Boyle's claim that the prosecutor would
not assist him in DNA testing and declared his § 1983 claim invalid under
Preiser and Heck.63 When Boyle is viewed in combination with Kutzner and
Harvey, it is evident that these circuits view § 1983 lawsuits seeking post-
conviction DNA testing as habeas petitions in disguise, and reject them
accordingly.
64
C. Another Circuit Court of Appeals Went the Opposite Way and Allowed §
1983 in the Post-Conviction Setting
At the same time that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits were rejecting
post-conviction § 1983 lawsuits, the Eleventh Circuit took the bold step of
allowing them in Bradley v. Pryor.65 In Bradley, an inmate who was convicted
and sentenced to death filed a § 1983 claim seeking to obtain DNA evidence
from the government.66 His § 1983 motion was dismissed by the lower court,
which described the motion as the "'functional equivalent' of a second habeas
petition" that had not been filed according to proper habeas procedures. 67 Seen
as a habeas corpus petition, Bradley's case would have been dismissed under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit's approach; however, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that DNA testing may yield evidence that is either exculpatory or
Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 389, 410-12 (2002) (arguing for statutory standards whereby
prosecutors "seek the fullest possible accounting of the truth," give full disclosure in completed
cases, and "utilize the most accurate scientific methods" to ensure those convicted were properly
convicted).
60. Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340 (noting that the court "agree[s] with the analysis of the Fourth
Circuit" in Harvey).
61. Id.at340-41.
62. Boyle, 46 F. App'x at 340.
63. Id. at 340 ("Boyle plainly challenged the validity of his criminal convictions and the fact
or duration of his continued confinement. Thus, the district court properly found that the
exclusive federal remedy for his claims was a writ of habeas corpus.").
64. See Boyle, 46 F. App'x at 340 (The court held that the defendant's "exclusive federal
remedy . . . was a writ of habeas corpus."); Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 341 (concluding that the
defendant's § 1983 claims "were only cognizable in habeas corpus"); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d
370, 374 (4th Cir. 2002) ("While we agree with Harvey that the question of guilt or innocence lies
at the heart of the criminal justice system, we also believe that the proper process for raising
violations of constitutional rights in criminal proceedings cannot be abandoned. Because the
substance of a claim cannot be severed from the proper manner of presenting it, we find Harvey's
§ 1983 action to be deficient.").
65. Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002).
66. Id. at 1288.
67. Id. at 1289.
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inculpatory. 68 Consequently, the DNA testing would not amount to a direct, or
even an indirect, attack on Bradley's conviction or duration of sentence.
69
Rather, the testing would only be an initial step in a long legal battle. 70 Based
on this reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the decision of
the district court.
D. The Supreme Court Bolstered the Eleventh Circuit with a Focus on
"Necessarily"
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed a portion of the circuit split between
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits and the Eleventh Circuit in favor of the
Eleventh Circuit in Wilkinson v. Dotson.7 2  In Dotson, two state prisoners,
William Dotson and Rogerico Johnson, brought a § 1983 lawsuit to complain,
primarily, about what they saw as ex post facto parole denials. 73 The lower
court denied relief, stating that the men should have filed under habeas corpus,
rather than § 1983. 74  The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court, and Ohio
parole officials appealed.75 The Supreme Court held that the inmate's claims
were cognizable under § 1983 and affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit.
76
Although Dotson addressed parole and not post-conviction access to
evidence for DNA testing, the Court's discussion of Preiser and Heck offered
some important clarification about how the principles set forth in those cases
68. Id. at 1291; see also 150 CONG. REC. S11609, 11610 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Post-conviction DNA testing does not merely exonerate the innocent;
it can also solve crimes and lead to the incarceration of very dangerous criminals. In case after
case, DNA testing that exculpates a wrongfully convicted individual also inculpates the real
criminal. Just this year, for example, the exoneration of Arthur Lee Whitfield in Virginia led to
the identification of another inmate, already serving a life sentence, as the true perpetrator of two
rapes for which Whitfield had served 22 years in prison. Last year, DNA evidence in the case of
Kirk Bloodsworth was matched to another man, a convicted sex offender who has now pleaded
guilty to the horrendous rape-murder that sent Mr. Bloodsworth to Maryland's death row.").
69. Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1291 ("The results of any DNA tests that are eventually performed
may be inconclusive, they may be insufficiently exculpatory, or they may even be inculpatory.
That these scientific possibilities exist, in and of itself, suffices to establish that the asserted right
of mere access is not a direct, or for that matter even an indirect, attack on one's conviction or
sentence." (quoting Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of reh'g en bane))).
70. Id. ("[T]he petitioner would have to initiate an entirely separate action at some future
date, in which he would have to argue for his release upon the basis of a separate constitutional
violation altogether.").
71. Id. at 1292 (noting that Bradley merely sought the production of evidence in the form of
DNA testing).
72. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005).
73. Id. at 76-77 (noting that both defendants claimed that the state retroactively applied
harsher parole standards).
74. Id. at 77.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 85.
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might apply to post-conviction testing.77 First, the Court defined the clear
limits of Preiser, which it stated prevents an inmate from filing a § 1983
lawsuit to challenge the "fact or duration of his confinement" and prevents him
78from seeking either release or the shortening of his sentence. Second, the
Court explained that its decision in Wolff v. McDonnell meant that § 1983
could not be used to restore good-time credit, but could be used to get a
statement demonstrating that the procedures used to deny those credits were
invalid.79  The Court then proceeded to its main point: that from Preiser
onward the Court had demanded habeas petitions when inmates wanted to
invalidate the duration of their incarceration. Focusing on the term
"necessarily," 8' the Court concluded that an inmate's § 1983 lawsuit would not
be barred if the result of that suit would not necessarily result in his release.
82
Since Dotson and Johnson's lawsuit did not necessitate their release, it was
allowed to go forward.83
E. Other Circuits Keyed on "Necessarily" and Followed the Eleventh Circuit's
Model
Other circuit courts in the United States have since applied the reasoning of
Dotson and Bradley by allowing § 1983 lawsuits in post-conviction DNA
cases. The first such instance occurred only a few months after the Dotson
decision in the Ninth Circuit case of Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for
the Third Judicial District.84 There, Osborne filed a § 1983 lawsuit to compel
DNA testing while his state appeal for relief was still pending. 85 The districtcourt relied on Heck and dismissed the § 1983 claim, stating that, by filing the
77. Id. at 78-84 (explaining the history of the Court's jurisprudence regarding § 1983
challenges to an inmate's confinement).
78. Id. at 79.
79. Id. at 79-80 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)).
80. Id. at 81 ("[T]he Court has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only
habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their
confinement-either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly
through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's
custody.").
81. Id. at 81-82.
82. Id. ("These cases, taken together, indicate that a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred
(absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter
the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration."); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (focusing
on whether the § 1983 claim "necessarily" implies the conviction was invalid in a good-time
credit case).
83. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 82 (concluding that both respondents had valid § 1983 suits).
84. 423 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005), remanded to 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (D. Alaska 2006),
aff'd, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008) (No.
08-6).
85. Id. at 1052.
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claim, Osborne was "'set[ting] the stage' for an attack on his underlying
conviction," and therefore his only remedy was a habeas petition.8 6 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed; 87 it concluded that "§ 1983 and habeas are not always
mutually exclusive." 88  The court indicated that Osborne's lawsuit did not
necessarily challenge his conviction because it would provide him access to
evidence that could actually prove, rather than disprove, his guilt.89  Even if
the evidence exonerated him, another action based on a completely separate
constitutional violation would be needed to overturn his conviction.
90
The Ninth Circuit's lead was subsequently followed by the Seventh Circuit
in its decision of Savory v. Lyons.91  As discussed above, Savory was a
convicted murderer who sought DNA testing to prove his innocence. 92 The
Seventh Circuit analyzed whether Savory's claim was cognizable under § 1983
and, like the Dotson court, focused on whether the § 1983 claim "necessarily"
invalidated the confinement or the duration of the confinement. 93 The court
analyzed the approaches taken by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, but
rejected them. Instead, the court adopted the approach taken by the Eleventh
and Ninth Circuits, finding it "more consistent with Preiser and its progeny,"
including Dotson.95 The court noted that, while the exception for § 1983 is
narrow, courts must be mindful of the form and function of a plaintiffs
complaint when reviewing whether the claim fits the narrow exception. 96 In
Savory's case, access to evidence "would not imply the invalidity of his
conviction" and would perhaps allow him to use the test results in another,
future lawsuit. 97 Therefore, his lawsuit was cognizable under § 1983.98
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1056.
88. Id. at 1055.
89. Id. at 1045.
90. See id. at 1054-55. The Ninth Circuit stated: "[a]ny remaining doubt as to the propriety
of this approach is removed, we believe, by the Court's recent opinion in Dotson, which reads
'necessarily' to mean 'inevitably' and rejects the notion that a claim which can be brought in
habeas must be brought in habeas." Id. at 1055.
91. 469 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2433 (2007).
92. Id. at 669-70.
93. See id. at 671 ("Preiser and its progeny [such as Dotson] have clearly and consistently
emphasized that only those claims that, if successful, would 'necessarily' invalidate the fact or
duration of the prisoner's confinement are restricted to habeas.").
94. See id. at 671-72.
95. Id. at 672.
96. See id. ("Special attention, however, must be given to the manner in which the plaintiff
frames his complaint, and the consequences that would follow from a favorable disposition.").
97. Id.
98. Id. ([S]uccess in Savory's action will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding
criminal judgment against [the plaintiff] . (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994))).
1255
Catholic University Law Review
The Second Circuit applied essentially the same analysis in McKithen v.
Brown, siding with the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 99 McKithen was
convicted of the attempted murder of his estranged wife with a kitchen
knife.100  The knife was never DNA tested (or even fingerprinted), and
McKithen eventually filed a § 1983 lawsuit in 2002 to gain access to that
knife. 101 Contrary to the lower court's ruling, the Second Circuit determined
that the "necessarily" language allowed for McKithen to bring a § 1983 suit. 102
The court also addressed an issue that had not been dealt with explicitly in the
other circuits, the motive of the plaintiff.103  The court explained that the
plaintiffs motive in filing his suit should not matter in the consideration of his
case. 10 4  After determining that this suit would not necessarily lead to
McKithen's release and that motive was irrelevant, the court remanded his case
for further proceedings.'
1 05
In McKithen, the Second Circuit also noted district court cases from the First
and Third Circuits, which have yet to speak on this circuit split.1 0 6 In Wade v.
Brady, a district court in Massachusetts addressed an inmate's suit against
local prosecutors in an attempt to gain access to physical evidence.,0 7  The
plaintiff, a man with borderline retardation, was denied relief at the state level
and then sought to use § 1983 to gain access to his evidence. 08 Relying on the
same reasoning of courts allowing similar § 1983 lawsuits, 10 9 the district court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 10 While the court was careful to
99. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1218 (2008).
100. Id. at 93-94.
101. Id. at 94. The knife was admitted into evidence after being identified by McKithen's
wife as the assault weapon. Id
102. Id. at 102 ("We conclude that the governing standard for application of the Preiser-Heck
exception, then, is whether a prisoner's victory in a § 1983 suit would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; that a prisoner's success might be merely helpful or
potentially demonstrative of illegal confinement is, under this standard, irrelevant.").
103. See id. (The court noted that the test for a § 1983 suit is "not whether a plaintiff intends
to bring subsequent challenges . I..." in fact, the court stated that "a prisoner's motives for
bringing a § 1983 suit are ... also plainly beside the point." (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 78 (2005))). In Dotson, the court criticized the state's argument: "[tihe problem with
Ohio's argument lies in its jump from a true premise (that in all likelihood the prisoners hope
these actions will help bring about earlier release) to a faulty conclusion (that habeas is their sole
avenue for relief)." Dotson, 544 U.S. at 78.
104. McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103 ("[E]ven if a plaintiffs ultimate motive is to challenge his
conviction-a post-conviction claim for access to evidence is cognizable under § 1983.").
105. See id. at 102-03, 108.
106. Id. at 99.
107. Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229 (D. Mass. 2006).
108. Id. at 229-30. It should be noted that one of the major problems Wade faced at trial in
regard to DNA testing was that testing "had only been ruled admissible in Massachusetts courts
one week before [his] trial began." Id at 229 n.3.
109. See id. at 236-39 (discussing the application of Heck and Dotson to the current case).
110. Id.at251.
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note that its decision did not actually grant Wade access to the evidence at
issue, it was also mindful to demonstrate that ideas of fairness required the
denial of the motion to dismiss. 11'
The Second Circuit also cited the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's decision
in Derrickson v. Delaware County District Attorney's Office, which permitted
access to evidence through the use of § 1983."' Derrickson was convicted of
murder and numerous other charges in 1995.113 He made many unsuccessful
filings in the ensuing years, including a habeas corpus petition, culminating in
his filing a § 1983 lawsuit. 114 The prosecutors argued, as in other cases, that
Heck barred Derrickson's suit. 115 The court disagreed, finding that a claim
such as Derrickson's was cognizable under § 1983 because the requested
evidence did not necessarily challenge his conviction. 116 The court ultimately
determined, however, that Derrickson's specific claims did not amount to a
denial of due process and therefore granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 117
II. CONGRESS'S ATTEMPT TO HELP IN THE POST-CONVICTION TESTING ARENA:
THE INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT OF 2004
A. Shortcomings that Congress Attempted to Address
While inmates who proclaim their innocence have long faced a doubting
public and judiciary, 118 over the past few decades many state legislatures have
11. Id. at 231 ("DNA testing is different [from other post-conviction challenges]. Because
DNA testing can exonerate the defendant, the government may only legitimately deny access to
testing if it has a compelling reason to do so. To hold otherwise would subordinate the pursuit of
justice to an arid obsession with procedure. Where DNA evidence can prove that a miscarriage of
justice was perpetrated by an earlier verdict, our interest in fundamental fairness and the integrity
of the criminal justice system require that DNA testing be allowed. Because I find that a Due
Process right to DNA testing does exist, I hereby deny defendant's motion to dismiss.").
112. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1218
(2008) (citing Derrickson v. Del. County Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 04-1569, 2006 WL
2135854, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006)).
113. Derrickson, 2006 WL 2135854, at *l.
114. Id. at *2-5.
115. See id. at *7.
116. Id. at *8 ("Although Derrickson hopes that testing the clothing evidence will produce
exculpatory evidence that will ultimately lead to overturning his conviction, the evidence does not
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. The clothing evidence may just as easily prove
inculpatory as exculpatory. Because of the uncertain material effect of the clothing evidence,
granting access to the evidence for further testing does not necessarily imply the invalidation of
Derrickson's conviction.").
117. Id. at *11.
118. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1993). In that case, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist referred to safeguards, especially in capital cases, that "have the effect of
ensuring against the risk of convicting an innocent person." Id One such safeguard is
supposedly clemency, but clemency is an inadequate protection. See Alyson Dinsmore,
Comment, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L.
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decided to enact reforms. 19 For example, New York passed the first DNA-
access statute in 1994.120 Illinois followed New York's lead in 1998,121 and
today forty-two states have some sort of post-conviction DNA statute.
122
Unfortunately, while the fact that so many states have these statutes is
promising, the statutes often contain important shortcomings.123
REv. 1825, 1827 (2002) ("[Clemency's] ability to thwart such possible miscarriages of justice is
in fact questionable.").
119. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 237, 266-68
(noting that many states permit defendants access to DNA evidence). Rosen discussed that DNA
statutes have come into existence in response to exonerations, but noted that "[d]espite the strong
impetus provided by the DNA exonerations, it is too early to conclude that the American criminal
justice system has made the fundamental changes that would appreciably diminish the incidence
of wrongful convictions." Id. at 269.
120. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKinney 2005). But see 150 CoNG. REc.
S 11609, 11612 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Ten years after New York
passed the nation's first post-conviction DNA testing statute, many States have yet to establish a
right to post-conviction DNA testing, and others have erected unjustifiably high procedural
hurdles to testing. For example, some States provide for post-conviction DNA testing only if the
inmate is under sentence of death, and some rely on arbitrary and unnecessary time limits. To
quote New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who testified in support of the Innocence
Protection Act in June 2000, 'DNA testing is too important to allow some States to offer no
remedy to those incarcerated who may be innocent of the crimes for which they were
convicted."').
121. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3(c)(1) (West. Supp. 2008) (permitting testing
only if "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence even though the
results may not completely exonerate the defendant." (emphasis added)); see also Karen
Christian, Note, "And the DNA Shall Set You Free ". Issues Surrounding Postconviction DNA
Evidence and the Pursuit ofInnocence, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1195, 1203-05 (2001) (discussing the
limitations of the New York and Illinois statutes in relation to two specific cases).
122. See The Innocence Project, News and Information: Fact Sheets, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/304.php [hereinafter Innocence Project Fact Sheet] (last visited
Aug. 18, 2008). The eight states that do not have testing statutes are Alabama, Alaska,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id; see
also Solomon Moore, DNA Exoneration Leads to Change in Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2007, at Al.
123. See Innocence Project Fact Sheet, supra note 122 (The fact sheet lists some
shortcomings of state statutes, such as: 1) "Some laws present insurmountable hurdles to the
individual seeking access, putting the burden on the defense to effectively solve the crime and
prove that the DNA evidence promises to implicate another individual." 2) "Despite the fact that
ten of the first 207 individuals proven innocent through DNA testing initially plea-bargained,
certain laws still do not permit access to DNA when the defendant originally pled guilty." 3)
"Many laws fail to include adequate safeguards for the preservation of DNA evidence." 4)
"Several laws do not allow individuals to appeal denied petitions for testing." 5) "A number of
states fail to require full, fair and prompt proceedings once a DNA testing petition has been filed,
allowing the potentially innocent to languish interminably in prison."); see also Press Release,
Sen. Leahy on Gov. George Ryan's Moratorium on Executions in Illinois (Jan. 31, 2000)
available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200001/000131 .html (When discussing the moratorium
on the death penalty in Illinois, Senator Leahy stated at the time: "This will also be a catalyst for a
similar review in Washington. Regardless of whether people are for or against the death penalty,
it is undeniable that shocking numbers of innocent people are falsely convicted and sentenced to
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James S. Liebman of Columbia University Law School published a 2002
study of more than 5000 capital punishment cases, which revealed another
problem unaddressed by many states.' 24 Liebman's study found that "[a]ll but
one of the 10 states with the highest death-sentencing rates had overall reversal
rates that exceeded 68%-the national average."' 25  While the study did not
attempt to go so far as to claim that any specific innocent person had been
executed, it did tend to support the doubts of one former Supreme Court
Justice that the death penalty system works fairly.1
26
B. Congress's Response to the Shortcomings of the States
Congress began seriously debating a solution to the problem of wrongful
convictions in 2000 when Senator Leahy first introduced the IPA. 12' The
primary purpose of the IPA was to reduce wrongful convictions by allowing
DNA testing. 128  Senator Leahy's statements at the introduction of the IPA
recognized that DNA should be used to prove both guilt and innocence.129 The
Senator also emphasized that while the IPA addressed "grave and urgent
problems with moderate, fine-tuned practical solutions," it also did not attempt
death. The criminal justice system is often unable to admit mistakes, even when they involve the
death penalty. We should have zero tolerance for executing the innocent. It is time to make
sensible reforms that can dramatically reduce these errors, like ensuring competent counsel and
prompt access to new crime-fighting tools such as DNA typing.").
124. See Henry Weinstein, Death Penalty Study Suggests Errors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002,
at A 13.
125. Id; see also CNN.com, DNA Wins Freedom for Man After 26 Years, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/0l/03/dna.exoneration.ap/ (noting that Texas, a leader in
executions, has "released at least 30 wrongfully convicted inmates since 2001.").
126. See Weinstein, supra note 124. The paper reported that "[i]n a speech last summer,
[Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day] O'Connor said, 'If statistics are any indication, the system
may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed."' Id; see also CBSNews.com,
Lawyers' Group: Halt Executions, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/
10/29/national/main3422627.html (reporting that the ABA has called for a stay of all executions
in the United States because of "[s]potty collection and preservation of DNA evidence . . .
misidentification by eyewitnesses, false confessions from defendants, and persistent racial
disparities that make death sentences more likely when victims are white").
127. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S89, 142 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("We know that the nightmare of innocent people on death row is not just a dream, but a
frequently recurring reality. Since the early 1970s, more than 100 people who were sentenced to
death have been released-not because of technicalities, but because they were innocent.
Goodness only knows how many were not so lucky."); Larry Yackle, Congressional Power to
Require DNA Testing, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1173, 1173 (2001) (arguing that the IPA was
"constitutionally feasible" in the face of early constitutional criticism).
128. 149 CONG. REc. S89, 142. A secondary purpose of the IPA, the Senator stated, was to
provide competent counsel. Id. The discussion of the competency of counsel is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
129. Id.
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"to make the system perfect, but simply to reduce what is currently an
unacceptably high risk of error."'
130
After several years of debate, the IPA was finally passed and signed into law
in 2004 as part of the broader JFAA. 13 1 The IPA provides that, upon written
motion by an inmate, "the court that entered the judgment of conviction shall
order DNA testing of specific evidence if the court finds that all of the
following [ten subsections] apply."'132 One notable shortcoming is that DNA
testing may only be ordered in cases involving federal offenses, effectively
precluding many state inmates from seeking evidentiary access.' 33 The general
section contains ten subsections, all of which must be met by the inmate, 134
including requirements such as: the inmate can only pursue DNA testing under
"penalty of perjury" and must claim he is "actually innocent;"'135 the evidence
is in the possession of the government and has been kept under a proper chain
of custody over the years; 136 and "the identity of the perpetrator was at issue in
the trial" if the applicant was convicted following a trial. 37 The IPA contains
additional prerequisites such as notice,' 38 testing procedures, 39 and post-
testing procedures. 40
130. Id.
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 2006); Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
Senator Leahy, a prime sponsor of the bill, felt that the Bush administration was often an obstacle
to its passage. See 150 CONG. REC. S 10910, 10916 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("Today, at long last, the Senate is poised to pass the Justice For All Act and to send this
important legislation to the President. I hope he will sign it, despite his Justice Department's
continued efforts to kill this bill."). Regarding the bill's passage, Senator Leahy summarized:
The reforms it enacts will create a fairer system of justice, where the problems that
have sent innocent people to death row are less likely to occur, where the American
people can be more certain that violent criminals are caught and convicted instead of
the innocent people who have been wrongly put behind bars for their crimes, and where
victims and their families can be more certain of the accuracy, and finality, of the
results.
Id.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (emphasis added).
133. See id. (stating that courts can order DNA testing for state offenses only if those crimes
are accompanied by federal convictions).
134. Id. § 3600(a)(l)-(10).
135. Id. § 3600(a)(1).
136. Id. § 3600(a)(4).
137. Id. § 3600(a)(7).
138. Id. § 3600(b).
139. Id. § 3600(c).
140. Id. § 3600(f.
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C. The IPA in Action Results in Failure
The case of Danny Boose of Mississippi illustrates that the IPA has not
eliminated all the barriers for inmates who seek DNA testing. 14  Boose was
convicted of kidnapping and raping a woman in 1996.14 2  DNA testing
concluded that the semen samples from the victim's clothes contained Boose's
blood. 143 Boose, however, maintained his innocence and filed for relief under
the IPA, claiming that better testing had developed and that the original lab
results may have been unreliable.
14 4
Before examining Boose's claims, the court took the time to note that the
IPA "provides a method to order DNA testing in cases if the defendant can
,,145
meet ten factors (with some factors having multiple requirements). The
court then highlighted subsections three, four, six, and eight of the IPA as
particularly relevant to Boose's case. 14 6 The Boose court determined that the
plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of those four subsections and,
therefore, could not file a valid claim under the IPA. 147 For example, physical
evidence in this case was destroyed on or about September 2, 1997 in
accordance with FBI policy. 148 Therefore, the plaintiff could not show that the
government possessed the evidence subject to a chain of custody as required
by 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (a)(4). 149 As a result, the IPA provided no relief to Boose
and his motion for testing was denied.
50
141. United States v. Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Miss. 2007).
142. Id at 888.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 889-91.
145. Id. at 889.
146. Id. ("Among other factors, the court must find that: (1) the case did not involve previous
DNA testing or that there is newer, more effective DNA testing available (18 U.S.C. §
3600(a)(3)); (2) that 'the specific evidence to be tested is in the possession of the Government and
has been subject to a chain of custody and retained under conditions sufficient to ensure that such
evidence has not been substituted, contaminated, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any
respect material to the proposed DNA testing' (18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(4)); (3) that the defendant
shows that the evidence would establish a theory of defense that is not inconsistent with an
affirmative defense and would establish actual innocence of the defendant (18 U.S.C. §
3600(a)(6)); and, (4) that the DNA testing would raise a reasonable possibility that the defendant
is actually innocent of the crime (18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)).").
147. Id. at 890-92.
148. Id. at 891.
149. See id
150. Id. at 892.
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III. WHERE Do §§ 1983 & 3600 Go WRONG?
A. While the Supreme Court Must Resolve the Split, § 1983 Could Never
Provide Appropriate Relief
1. The Outdated Circuit Courts Must Rule in Line with Bradley
The first major problem with § 1983's application is that three circuit courts
are denying suits based on an outdated interpretation of § 1983.151 The Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits' decisions to bar § 1983 actions for post-conviction
access appeared reasonable at the time they were issued because these circuits
followed existing Supreme Court precedent in holding as they did."'
Specifically, in Preiser, the Supreme Court had established that challenges to
the fact or duration of imprisonment were not cognizable under § 1983.153
Furthermore, the Preiser Court made it clear that it considered federal-state
comity to be key in its decision, because habeas corpus petitions require
exhaustion of all state options, whereas § 1983 does not. 54 Heck supported
Preiser by clarifying that the only way an inmate can challenge the fact or
duration of confinement, either directly or indirectly, is through habeas.
1 55
Therefore, through early 2002, it was reasonable for the Fourth Circuit to rule
as it did and for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits to follow.
156
The Eleventh Circuit took an opposing, but equally reasonable, view of
Preiser and Heck later in 2002, arguing that the Fourth Circuit rule was wrong
and causing a major problem. 57 By emphasizing that DNA testing could be
151. See Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340, 340 (6th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery
County, 303 F.3d 339, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2002); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 372 (4th Cir.
2002).
152. See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475,489-90 (1973).
153. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-90.
154. Id. at 491-92 ("It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger
interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than
the administration of its prisons."); see also id. at 505 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
majority's decision left untouched the rule that § 1983 does not require exhaustion of state
remedies). But see Rosen, supra note 119, at 285-86 ("A claim of innocence is not based on a
technicality-it is a claim that the legal system made the most fundamental of errors, that the
imposition of punishment was unjust from the inception. Notions of comity, retroactivity,
finality, procedural default-all of the means we use to keep the system from being overwhelmed
by guilty defendants trying to escape their punishment-have no place when the claim is that the
trial ended in a miscarriage ofjustice.").
155. Heck, 512 U.S. at481.
156. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375 ("While Heck dealt with a § 1983 claim for damages, the
Court did not limit its holding to such claims. And we see no reason why its rationale would not
apply in a situation where a criminal defendant seeks injunctive relief that necessarily implies the
invalidity of his conviction.").
157. Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (1 th Cir. 2002) (indicating that Judges King
and Luttig's concurring opinions in Harvey correctly identified the Fourth Circuit majority's
error).
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either exculpatory or inculpatory and that any positive DNA results would only
lead to a separate lawsuit for actual relief,158 the Bradley court demonstrated a
deeper understanding of the true intent behind Preiser and Heck and properly
picked up on the use of the word "necessarily." 159 Then the Eleventh Circuit
approach was bolstered by a later Supreme Court case on point, Dotson, which
also emphasized application of the word "necessarily." ' 60 The Court stressed
that it had made it "clear that § 1983 remains available for procedural
challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate
or speedier release for the prisoner."
'161
Other federal courts facing similar § 1983 actions have since followed the
Eleventh Circuit approach while also adding new layers to the analysis.1
62
First, the Ninth Circuit in Osborne drew out the distinction that § 1983 and
habeas corpus are not the same under the Preiser exception.' 63 Second, the
Second Circuit in McKithen determined that the motive of an inmate in filing
his suit should not be a factor considered by the courts.' 64 Third, the district
court in Wade suggested that, although DNA testing itself may not be used to
attack the finality of a conviction, permitting such testing is procedurally fair
where doubt exists about the original conviction1 65 Finally, in Derrickson,
another district court highlighted the discouraging fact that the long road of §
1983 might be an inmate's last hope, but often leads to no positive result.
158. Id. at 1290-91.
159. See id. at 1290 ("Bradley seeks access, for the purpose of DNA testing, to evidence that
he believes is in the State's possession. He prevails in this lawsuit once he has access to that
evidence or an accounting for its absence. Nothing in that result necessarily demonstrates or even
implies that his conviction is invalid." (emphasis added)).
160. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
161. Id.
162. See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1218
(2008); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th
Cir. 2005), remanded to 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (D. Alaska 2006), aff'd, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008) (No. 08-6); Wade v. Brady, 460 F.
Supp. 2d 226, 244 (D. Mass. 2006); Derrickson v. Del. County Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 04-
1569, 2006 WL 2135854, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006).
163. See Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1055 ("Preiser's implied exception to § 1983 coverage exists
'where the claim seeks-not where it simply "relates to"--"core" habeas corpus relief, i.e., where
a state prisoner requests present or future release."' (quoting Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81)).
164. McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103 n.15 ("It is now beyond dispute that a § 1983 plaintiff's
unspoken motives-as contrasted with the relief the plaintiff has in fact sought-are merely red
herrings.").
165. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 248-49 ("DNA testing does not itself attack the finality of
a judgment. Attacks on a conviction can only occur if a DNA test yields exculpatory results. In
these cases, the State should have grave concerns about the fairness and accuracy of the original
verdict. When the State loses faith in a trial verdict, it no longer has valid reason to detain an
individual. Retribution and deterrence are not served by continued incarceration, and judging is
not improved by further detention.").
166. See Derrickson, 2006 WL 2135854, at *11 (noting that Derrickson failed to establish
that DNA evidence had a "reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of his criminal trial").
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Differences among habeas petitions, motives of the claimant, fairness of the
proceedings, and the lack of alternatives are all factors to consider when
analyzing6§ 1983, and all lend credence to the approach originally outlined by
Bradley.16
Despite Bradley's widespread acceptance, the Supreme Court's failure to
clarify whether the Eleventh Circuit was correct and whether the outdated
approach utilized by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits should be rejected
has left the federal courts without clear guidance as to the propriety of § 1983
lawsuits seeking DNA testing.' The language used by the Court in Dotson,
with the emphasis on the word "necessarily," strongly suggests that the use of
§ 1983 suits to obtain DNA testing is proper because such suits do not
necessarily lead to any direct attack on imprisonment. 169 As the Ninth Circuit
stated in 2005 in Osborne, "Dotson thus erases any doubt that Heck applies
both to actions for money damages and to those, like this one, for injunctive
relief, and clarifies that Heck provides the relevant test to determine whether §
1983 is a permissible avenue of relief for Osborne." 170 Because all doubt has
been erased in the minds of four circuit courts and two district courts, the
Supreme Court should clearly state that those circuits are correct and that the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits must fall in line.
2. Clarifying § 1983 Would Be a Good Step, But § 1983 Falls Short of
Solving the Problem on Its Own
While the Supreme Court's support of Bradley would clarify the problem of
initial access to § 1983, it would fail to address the second, deeper set of
problems which § 1983 cannot adequately solve.17 1 First, as demonstrated by
the Eleventh Circuit itself, § 1983 does not get an inmate very far in obtaining
any real relief because an inmate still must bring a later suit to challenge the
actual conviction. 172 That an inmate does not necessarily achieve success with
§ 1983 is a convenient legal fact that has allowed the Eleventh Circuit and
The court summarized Derrickson's unsuccessful plight: "[t]o date, Derrickson's conviction has
not been overturned on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state court, or
called into question by a federal court via writ of habeas corpus." Id. at *3.
167. See Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2002).
168. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 244 ("Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has
ruled on the constitutional significance of DNA testing.").
169. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
170. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th
Cir. 2005), remanded to 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (D. Alaska 2006), af'd, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008) (No. 08-6).
171. See, e.g., Derrickson, 2006 WL 2135854, at *8-11 (concluding that although testing
would not necessarily result in plaintiff's release from jail, the particular circumstances of his
case did not add up to a due process violation in the mind of the court; therefore, the DNA testing
was denied).
172. Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1290-91.
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others to recognize that these suits are cognizable.' 73 The recognition of a §
1983 claim, however, provides little support to inmates who were perhaps
wrongly incarcerated for decades. 174 The long road inmates face after winning
under § 1983 is too long.
The second underlying problem with § 1983 as a mechanism for relief is that
it fails to directly address inherent flaws in the system, all of which are present
in the case of Johnnie Lee Savory 11.175 The first flaw is that "[i]n more than
25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent defendants made incriminating
statements, delivered outright confessions or pled guilty."1 76 In Savory's case,
his initial confession, given as a fourteen year-old, was obtained after almost
two days of police questioning. 7 7
The second systemic flaw is that "[e]yewitness misidentification is the single
greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, playin a role in more than
75% of convictions overturned through DNA testing." After Savory's
173. See id. at 1292 (noting that a successful § 1983 claim merely grants access to evidence).
174. See, e.g., Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2433 (2007) (declining to rule on prisoner's § 1983 claim that sought DNA evidence because the
claim was barred by the statute of limitations); see also Ted Gregory, Parolee Joyful After 30
Years In Prison, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 2006, at C3 (reporting that Savory was finally released on
parole, after 30 years in prison).
175. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
176. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: False Confessions, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2008); see also
Rosen, supra note 119, at 246-47 (2006) ("Whatever slight protection against false confessions
the Miranda rule could be said to offer in 1967, the Supreme Court made clear over the following
decades that it would not interpret Miranda in a way that would seriously interfere with secret
police interrogations. In the years since Miranda, the Court has restricted its deterrent effect by
allowing statements taken in violation of a valid recitation or waiver of Miranda rights to be used
in numerous circumstances. In fact, the Court's efforts to neutralize Miranda's impact were so
successful that police officers had little incentive to give the warnings, or even to honor a
suspect's request that they honor his rights." (internal citations omitted)). Many local and state
governments have taken steps to prevent false confessions. See Moore, supra note 122 ("More
than 500 local and state jurisdictions, including Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia
have adopted polices that require the recording of interrogations to help prevent false confessions
.... .).
177. See Gregory, supra note 174.
178. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Aug.
18, 2008); see also Rosen, supra note 119, at 247 ("[M]isidentifications are the single largest
factor in producing wrongful convictions .... "); Moore, supra note 122 ("Legislatures
considered 25 witness identification bills in 17 states this year, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers reported. Five states approved bills, while five states defeated them.
Bills are pending in seven states. 'It's become clear that eyewitnesses are fallible,' said Lt.
Kenneth A. Patenaude, a police commander in Northampton, Mass., who is an expert on witness
identification techniques."). But see Ramsey County Attorney, The DNA Project,
http://www.co.ramsey.mn.us/attorney/SPDNA.asp (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (The county
attorney argued that DNA testing is unwarranted in most cases because "[i]n many [old cases],
the defendant's identity was not in question so DNA testing would serve no purpose.").
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confession was excluded on appeal, 179 he was re-tried and convicted, largely
due to the testimony of three new witnesses who claimed Savory shared self-
incriminating details of the crime.' 80  Two of the three witnesses later
recanted. 181
The third and final systemic flaw, as numerous cases have shown over the
last decade, is that courts continue to accept less-reliable forms of evidence,
despite the fact that DNA testing is uniquely capable of "show[ing] whether
someone is actually guilty or innocent. ' 82 In other words, the power of DNA
testing is thoroughly underutilized. 183  For example, Savory professed his
innocence throughout his almost thirty years in prison and pushed for DNA
testing of fingernail scrapings and hair, but was repeatedly denied judicial
relief. 184
While these flaws hindered Savory's attempts to exonerate himself, he was
ultimately unable to bring his § 1983 lawsuit because he failed to file a timely
claim. 185 Savory also failed to find an audience with the Supreme Court when
his petition for certiorari was denied on May 21, 2007.18F Fortunately for
Savory, he had already been paroled on December 19, 2006.187 Nineteen
179. See Savory, 469 F.3d at 669 (noting that the confession was involuntarily provided in
violation of Savory's Miranda rights).
180. See Gregory, supra note 174.
181. See id
182. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Unreliable/Limited Science, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2008)
[hereinafter Innocence Project, Limited Science]; see also Rosen, supra note 119, at 256 ("The
scientific certainty of DNA evidence has made it hard for skeptics to question the exonerations of
the last decade, and to bury the accompanying powerful narratives under counternarratives of
crime victims' suffering. Perhaps inevitably, the heart-wrenching stories of wrongfully convicted
defendants has [sic] sparked at least the beginnings of a new wave of reforms.").
183. See 150 CoNG. REC. H8175, 8176 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. Myrick)
("Unfortunately, the current Federal and State DNA collection and analysis system suffers from a
variety of problems. In many cases public crime laboratories are overwhelmed by backlogs of
unanalyzed DNA samples, samples that could be used to solve violent crimes if the States had the
funds to eliminate this backlog. In my home State of North Carolina, the number of unprocessed
DNA samples is 7,000 and the number of unprocessed DNA rape kits is estimated to be 6,000.
North Carolina authorities say that the processing and entering of the DNA backlog could solve
hundreds of crimes."); see also id. at 8191 (statement of Rep. Weiner) ("With DNA we can find
out who did a crime, and as other speakers have spoken to here, we can also find out who did not
do it. But the prism I look at this issue through was formed early in my congressional career.
The prism I look at DNA through is a series of cardboard boxes all stacked in a refrigerated
warehouse in Long Island City. That is where I found rape kits that were evidence for crime
scenes, completely anonymous except for the numbers written on the side of these cardboard
boxes, 16,000 of them in early 1999 when I was first elected, all collected at crime scenes in New
York City, all that had not been analyzed, all that had not been processed, all representing a
victim that was awaiting justice.").
184. See Savory, 469 F.3d at 669-70; Gregory, supra note 174.
185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
186. Savory v. Lyons, 127 S. Ct. 2433 (2007).
187. See Gregory, supra note 174.
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requests for parole over thirty years finally paid off for Johnnie Lee Savory,
88
but the fact remains that § 1983 essentially did him no good in his bid to prove
his innocence.
B. Similar to § 1983, § 3600 Could Never Provide Appropriate Relief
The United States faced serious problems at the beginning of the new
millennium in the arena of DNA testing statutes.1 89 Not all states had a testing
statute, and many of the existing statutes were insufficient.' 9° In addition, a
national study suggested that states with the highest-death sentences rates also
led the nation in reversal rates.
1 91
The passage of the IPA "strongly suggests a congressional belief that
miscarriages do occur and that existing procedures are not wholly adequate to
rectify them."'1 92 Congress knew that problems existed and created the IPA to
improve access to DNA testing.
1 93
188. See id. Of course, not everyone was happy with Savory's parole, especially the named
defendant in Savory's case, Peoria County State's Attorney Kevin Lyons. Less than a month
after Savory's release, the appointment of a parole board member who had opposed Savory's
release was not renewed. Press Release, Kevin W. Lyons, Peoria County (Ill.) State's Att'y, (Jan.
9, 2007) available at http://www.peoriacountystatesattomey.org/press%20release-stenson%
20release%20from%20ILPRB.htm. In a press release in support of the departing board member
and in condemnation of Savory, Lyons stated the following:
And so we now have the newly reconstituted Illinois Prisoner Review Board, the
Will Rogers of parole boards, for they never met a murderer they didn't like. On behalf
of the law abiding People of Peoria County and central Illinois, I register my disgust
with the parole board's cavalier coddling of criminals and the state senate's ugly
poisoning of the parole board membership by surreptitiously shutting the door to law
and order members while opening the door to Johnnie Lee Savory and his ilk, all
coming soon to a neighborhood near you.
Id.
189. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
190. See Innocence Project Fact Sheet, supra note 122; see also Kathy Swedlow, Don't
Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern "Post-Conviction" DNA Testing Statutes, 38
CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 387 (2002) (noting that the "lack of perfection in the extant testing statutes
is largely attributable to their inability to address the complexities of state and federal post-
conviction law.").
191. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
192. State v. Jimenez, 880 A.2d 468, 494 n.8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), rev'd, 908
A.2d 181 (N.J. 2006), clarified by 924 A.2d 513 (N.J. 2007). While the use of § 3600 was not at
issue in this case, the statute was briefly discussed by the court as "an additional device for
discerning miscarriages." Id; see also United States v. Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d 887, 889 (N.D.
Miss. 2007) ("Indeed, the entire purpose of the statute is to permit collateral review of convictions
through DNA testing-no matter how much time has transpired-or what other deadlines have
passed. What the statute seeks-with its narrow tailoring-is justice itself.").
193. See 150 CONG. REC. H8175, 8176 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. Myrick);
see also The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Forensic Science Misconduct,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Govemment-Misconduct.php (last visited Aug. 18,
2008) [hereinafter Innocence Project, Forensic Science Misconduct] ("DNA exonerations have
exposed official misconduct at every level and stage of a criminal investigation. This misconduct
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But a close analysis of § 3600, seen through the light of an example case
such as Boose, demonstrates the unfortunate shortcomings of § 3600.114 The
first major problem with § 3600 is that it is of limited use to state inmates
because it only permits relief to defendants convicted of federal offenses. 195 At
best, the IPA encourages states to adopt DNA testing legislation for state
offenses.
196
The second major problem is that the requirements of § 3600 are too
strict. 197 For example, one could look at § 3600(a)(3), "which requires that the
evidence must not have been previously subjected to DNA testing-or was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but a new method or technology is
substantially more probative than the prior DNA testing."' 98  Many courts,
such as the one in Boose's case, might reject the argument that new modes of
DNA testing should allow an inmate to re-test his evidence because of the
has included: deliberate suggestiveness in identification procedures[;] the withholding of
evidence from defense[;] the deliberate mishandling, mistreatment or destruction of evidence[;]
the coercion of false confessions[;] the use of unreliable government informants or snitches[.]").
As the Innocence Project website points out, many of the problems Congress sought to address
are actually created by government itself. Id.
194. See United States v. Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890-92 (N.D. Miss. 2007) (noting that
the defendant could not satisfy four of the ten requirements). The court also discussed an
unfortunate side-effect of the statute: that an inmate's test results are entered into the National
DNA Index System ("NDIS"). Id. at 890. Once an inmate is in NDIS, he could be connected to
unsolved crimes and bring further charges upon himself:
The Government shall submit any test results relating to the DNA of the applicant to
the National DNA Index System .... Ifthe ... comparison of the DNA sample of the
applicant results in a match between the DNA sample of the applicant and another
offenses, the Attorney General shall notify the appropriate agency ....
18 U.S.C. § 3600 (e)(2)-(e)(3)(B).
The Boose court commented on the dilemma posed to defendants:
[D]efendants who know they have committed crimes for which they have not been
charged-and for which DNA evidence could shed some light-may think twice before
availing themselves of this statute. New DNA testing could well confirm the guilt of
such a defendant already serving time-yet lead to his prosecution for other crimes in the
NDIS database.
Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a); see also 150 CONG. REC. S11609, 11612 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The provisions [of the Innocence Protection Act] ... will have
direct application to Federal cases and Federal defendants only. Earlier versions of the IPA
recognized a constitutional right of State prisoners to access biological evidence held by the State
for the purpose of DNA testing; as enacted, however, the IPA contains no such provision. This is
regrettable."). Senator Leahy indicated, but did not explicitly endorse, the proposition that access
to DNA testing may well be "constitutionally required as a matter of basic fairness." 150 CONG.
REC. S11612 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. 150 CONG. REC. S 11609 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[The
Innocence Protection Act] does encourage States that have not already done so to enact
provisions similar to section[] 3600.").
197. See, e.g., Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 890-92 (describing the various ways plaintiff failed
to meet the requirements of § 3600).
198. Id. at 890 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (a)(3)).
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court's understanding of the term "substantially more probative" as used in §
3600.199 A rule such as § 3600(a)(3) may work well for an inmate who never
had the benefit of testing, but it will not work as worded for most inmates who
obtained primitive DNA tests.
200
There are at least three other examples of how § 3600 is too strict. First, §
3600(a)(4) requires that the government possess the evidence, that the chain of
custody is unbroken, and that there are no problems such as contamination
with the evidence. 201 In practice, however, this standard is difficult to satisfy
because the FBI sometimes destroys physical evidence after a certain period of
.. . . . 2
time, making testing impossible. Second, § 3600(a)(6) requires the inmate
to have a "theory of defense" that is not inconsistent with the defense used at
trial and that "would establish . . .actual innocence. 20 3  Unsophisticated
inmates often do not possess a "theory of defense" beyond a claim of actual
innocence, but such claims will not suffice with a court.204 For example, in
Boose's case, the court would not accept Boose's claim of actual innocence
because his conviction was based in part on multiple eyewitnesses who
199. Id at 890-91 (finding newer testing techniques to be inapplicable to the testing sought
by the defendant); see also Rosen, supra note 119, at 276 ("On the other side, just as the DNA
exonerations have enhanced the need for maximizing the use of science in criminal cases, they
have also revealed the misuse of science. Many of the DNA exonerations have come in cases
where 'science' was used to produce the initial wrongful conviction. As a result, a hard
examination of much of what passes for science in the courts is necessary." (citations omitted)).
200. See, e.g., Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 890-91; see also Innocence Project, Limited
Science, supra note 182 (discussing the fact that traditional serology tests and earlier forms of
DNA testing are far less accurate than modem DNA testing); Innocence Project, Forensic Science
Misconduct, supra note 193 ("The risk of misconduct starts at the crime scene, where evidence
can be planted, destroyed or mishandled. Then the evidence is sent by police to a state forensic
lab or independent contractor, where it can be contaminated, poorly tested, consumed
unnecessarily or mislabeled. The next step is a report, in which technicians and their superiors
sometimes misrepresent results. DNA exonerations have revealed numerous instances of
'drylabbing' evidence-reporting results when no test was actually performed. It's cheaper and
faster-but fraudulent.").
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2006).
202. See Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 891 (holding that Boose could not satisfy § 3600(a)(4)
because the FBI destroyed the evidence).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(6).
204. See, e.g., Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 891-92; see also Rosen, supra note 119, at 285
("Another potential solution is to create procedures that would treat postconviction claims of
innocence separately from other claims. Much of the indifference or hostility to postconviction
innocence claims undoubtedly occurs because these claims get lost amid the myriad legal claims
of defendants who are undoubtedly guilty. The common assumption is that defendants seeking
relief after appeal are trying to get released on a 'technicality.' Leaving aside the fact that a
constitutional deficiency is in no way a 'technicality,' finding a way to separate claims of
innocence from other claims is worth considering.").
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205identified Boose. The court did not consider that the unreliability of
eyewitnesses is well documented, °6 and moved on.
A final example of how § 3600 can be too strict is § 3600(a)(8), which
requires that the testing produce evidence that would support a claim from §
3600(a)(6) and "raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did not
commit the offense." 207  This requirement is also problematic because an
inmate whose only claim is actual innocence will not get by § 3600(a)(6) and
will therefore fail under § 3600(a)(8) as well. 20 8
This analysis suggests that the vast majority of inmates will be unable to
obtain relief under § 3600. The IPA is made up of an overly elaborate ten-part
test.209 All of the parts of the test must be met for any applicant to move closer
to actual DNA testing. Even an inmate who satisfies several of the IPA's
requirements can be denied relief if he is unable to meet all ten parts. 2 1 At
least one court has found that an inmate's basic claim of innocence failed to
satisfy § 3600's pleading requirements. 212 As the judge in Boose stated, "'I
didn't do it' is "[s]uch a bare allegation [that it] hardly meets the rigorous
standard[s] of the Innocence Protection Act." 21 3 Thus, under this interpretation
of the IPA, an inmate who relies on a continual insistence of actual innocence
205. Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 892 ("Indeed, the overwhelming eyewitness testimony alone
would have been sufficient to sustain Danny Boose's conviction in this case.").
206. See id. (holding that defendant's base claim of innocence "hardly meets the rigorous
standard of the Innocence Protection Act"); see also Thorn Patterson, Innocent Man Shares His
20-Year Struggle Behind Bars, CNN, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.cnn.comI/2007/US/law/
10/25/innocence.project/index.html (discussing the case where Willie "Pete" Williams spent
nearly twenty-two years in prison for rape, kidnapping, and aggravated sodomy he did not
commit because "the key evidence that sealed Williams' fate was the testimony of three
eyewitnesses who mistakenly said they recognized him"); supra note 178 and accompanying text.
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8). Sponsors of the IPA believed the "reasonable probability"
standard was an appropriate threshold. 150 CONG. REc. S11609, 11610-11 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Th[e reasonable probability] standard was the subject of
intense negotiations, as members recognized that setting the standard too low could invite
frivolous applications, while setting it too high could defeat the purpose of the legislation and
result in grave injustice. I argued that in balancing these concerns, Congress should be guided by
the principle that the criminal justice system should err on the side of permitting testing, in light
of the low cost of DNA testing and the high cost of keeping the wrong person locked up. I am
pleased that this view ultimately prevailed.").
208. See Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (noting that Boose failed both § 3600(a)(6) and §
3600(a)(8)).
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(1)-(10).
210. Id. § 3600(a) (requiring the court to order DNA testing if "all of the following [ten
requirements] apply").
211. See, e.g., Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 889-92 (finding at least three flaws in Boose's suit
under § 3600).
212. Seeid. at 891-92.
213. Id. at 892.
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will find no relief. In a legal system where more than 200 Americans proved
they were innocent by DNA testing, 214 relief must be more readily available.
215
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION IS AVAILABLE AND MUST BE IMPLEMENTED
Because §§ 1983 and 3600 are inadequate to handle the need for post-
conviction DNA testing and the state remedies also fall short,216 a more
comprehensive solution is needed. The Innocence Project has drafted model
legislation, called "An Act Concerning Access to Post-Conviction DNA
Testing,"21 7 that should be adopted with only minor changes by every state
and, eventually, the federal government.
218
Model legislation in this area must contain several key components that are
markedly different from the current, short-sighted solutions. First, recognizing
that DNA testing is highly reliable and relatively inexpensive, 219 the legislation
should expand access to DNA testing. The model act accomplishes this goal
by allowing testing for any convict "who asserts he did not commit th[e] crime
.... ,,220 This would address the problem discussed above, that the ten-part test
of § 3600 and the technical requirements of reviewing an inmate's claim are
214. See Innocence Project, Know the Cases, supra note 4.
215. But see Gwendolyn Carroll, Comment, Proven Guilty: An Examination of the Penalty-
Free World of Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665, 665 (2007)
(arguing that DNA testing requested by inmates is costly and time-consuming, and that sanctions
should be imposed on petitioners whose guilt is confirmed through testing as a deterrent against
frivolous requests).
216. See supra Parts ILA, Ill.
217. See AN ACT CONCERNING ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING (The
Innocence Project Model Legislation 2006) [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT
MODEL LEGISLATION], available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ModelStatute_
PostconvictionDNA.pdf.
218. See Matthew J. Mueller, Comment, Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting
Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA
Evidence, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 260 (2006) (arguing that states are best equipped to handle
innocence claims related to DNA evidence, but that it would be appropriate for the federal courts
to review state claims if the inmate makes a "'truly persuasive' showing of actual innocence").
Muller argues that "[tihis outcome would also support Congress's attempts to prevent the flood of
habeas corpus claims from overwhelming the federal courts. Such a prisoner would already have
had one shot at direct federal review of his or her state conviction." Id.
219. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing Self-
Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 281 (2008) (noting that
DNA testing is becoming more accurate and less costly).
220. See INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 2 ("[A] person
convicted of a crime and who asserts he did not commit that crime may at any time file a petition
requesting forensic DNA testing of any biological evidence secured in relation to the
investigation or prosecution attendant to the conviction. Persons eligible for testing shall include
any and all of the following: A. Persons currently incarcerated, serving a sentence of probation or
who have already been released on parole; B. Persons convicted on a plea of not guilty, guilty or
nolo contendere; and/or C. Persons who have finished serving their sentences.").
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too complicated and strict.2 Second, the process should be speedy. The
petitioner should be able to file a motion and receive a response from the state
within 30 days; a court should hear the motion within 60 days of its filing. 
222
These rules would allow cases to be brought more easily and disposed of more
quickly, helping to address the problem that § 1983 lawsuits take a very long
time and often yield few positive results.223
The legislation should also contain a detailed section on what a court must
find before ordering DNA testing. First, there must be a "reasonable
probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or would have
received a lesser sentence" if there were favorable test results "at the time of
the original prosecution." 2 4  Such a standard is preferable to the theory of
defense required by § 3600 because an unsophisticated inmate claiming
innocence would satisfy this standard.225 Second, the model act requires that at
least one of the pieces of evidence sought to be tested must still exist.
226
Again, this is a better standard than the chain of custody requirements of §
3600, which punishes the petitioner for both the government's negligent
227handling of evidence and for its use of strict destruction policies. Third, the
evidence must have come from the offense that resulted in conviction and must
not have been tested before or, even if it was, "can be subjected to additional
DNA testing that provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative
results. 228 This requirement will provide a greater number of inmates with a
more useful way of accessing the advances in DNA testing than § 3600 can
because even those who had prior testing can avail themselves of further
testing.
229
Fourth, the chain of custody must be strong enough to exclude tampering, or,
if it is not, the testing itself must have "the potential to establish the integrity of
the evidence. ' 23° Such language makes more sense than the limiting languageseen in § 3600(a)(4), which requires that there can be no testing without an
221. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
222. See INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 3 (indicating that a
response should take no more than ninety days).
223. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
224. INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 4.
225. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
226. See INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 4.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Boose, 498 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891 (N.D. Miss. 2007)
(indicating that Boose could not obtain relief under § 3600 because the FBI had destroyed the
initial DNA evidence).
228. INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 4.
229. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
230. See INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 4 ("For purposes of
this Act, evidence that has been in the custody of law enforcement, other government officials or
a public or private hospital shall be presumed to satisfy the chain-of-custody requirement of this
subsection, absent specific evidence of material tampering, replacement or alteration.").
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231
unbroken chain of custody. Finally, the motion for DNA testing must be
made "to demonstrate innocence or the appropriateness of a lesser sentence
and not solely to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or the
administration of justice. 232 Such a requirement would weed out frivolous
suits brought only to frustrate the courts, but would still allow the
233
unsophisticated inmate to simply plead innocence.
This legislation would also go a long way toward solving three additional
problems evident in §§ 1983 and 3600. First, the legislation would directly
help those incarcerated as a result of their own incriminating statements or
inaccurate eyewitness identifications 234 because it would promote DNA testing
over the less reliable traditional forms of evidence. 23  Second, the legislation's
emphasis on access to DNA testing would signal the importance of testing and
236
would therefore help address the problem that DNA testing is underutilized.
And finally, adoption of the statute by all states, and eventually the federal
government, would address the serious problems caused by § 3600's limited
accessibility and its excessively strict requirements.2 37
V. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system must strive for a more effective and fair solution
for post-conviction DNA testing. Solutions adopted by the states fall short,
231. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
232. See INNOCENCE PROJECT MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 217, § 4.
233. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text; see also Rosen, supra note 119, at 286
("Allowing guilt or innocence to be litigated on appeal is one possible approach. In some judicial
systems, appellate courts can hear new evidence, reverse convictions, order new trials, or even
find the defendant innocent if they find that the decision at the trial stage was wrong or against
the weight of the evidence. Even in England, where the trial by jury most closely resembles ours,
the appellate courts can hear 'fresh evidence' and throw out convictions if they find that the
conviction was 'unsafe' or that the jury would not have necessarily returned the guilty verdict if
they had known of the fresh evidence. Similarly, allowing innocence to be litigated as a separate
claim at the post-appeal stage is preferable to litigating it in the guise of a Brady, ineffective
assistance, or newly discovered evidence claim (each of which has its own technical obstacles to
overcome)." (internal citations omitted)).
234. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
235. See 150 CONG. REc. H8179, 8192 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement ofRep. Maloney)
("DNA is accurate, it never forgets, it cannot be intimidated by a prosecutor; and we have to put
this technology to use in convicting criminals and freeing the innocent.").
236. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. See also 150 CONG. REC. S10674,
10676 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Crime labs across the country are
suffering the consequences of years of increased demand and decreased funding. One
consequence is sloppy lab work. Another consequence is massive backlogs. In December 2003,
the Department of Justice estimated that there were more than 500,000 criminal cases with
biological evidence awaiting DNA testing. This estimate included 52,000 homicide cases and
169,000 rape cases. Ten months later, the situation has only gotten worse. While the Senate has
been idle on this bill, rape kits and other crime scene evidence has been sitting on shelves,
untested for lack of funding.").
237. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
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and §§ 1983 and 3600 are too cumbersome, unwieldy, and ineffective to
provide adequate relief. Therefore, states should adopt the model legislation
advocated by this Comment, which does not provide inmates with a get-out-of-
jail-free card, but focuses on reasonable measures to ensure that justice was
done properly the first time around. Only by ensuring that those convicted of
crimes were properly put in prison can we ensure the ghost of the innocent
man does not haunt us all. 23
8
238. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 367 (2006) ("Indifference
to the plight of wrongly condemned and convicted prisoners in America ultimately breeds
contempt for the rule of law. We have invested billions into 'Corrections' while simultaneously
embracing a bewildering resistance to correcting fundamental violations of clearly established
constitutional rights. As a result, too many innocent and wrongly convicted men and women are
now locked down in jails and prisons where they should not be. Restoring fairness in collateral
appeals and remediating these wrongful convictions is the only corrective measure that can bring
justice to thousands of prisoners. A generation of policymakers, legislators, lawyers, law
students, and advocates will need to emerge and seriously challenge a legal and political
landscape that has become an impediment to providing fair and just treatment for this country's
most vulnerable and disempowered people. It is a challenge well worth undertaking if equal
justice is going to be anything more than an idea about which we hear, but never see."); see also
Holly Schaffier, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50
DRAKE L. REV. 695, 737-38 (2002) (noting that wrongful convictions should get the same
attention from states that "airplane crashes, defective automotive parts, medical malpractice,
fraud, or bad prescription drugs" currently do).
1274 [Vol. 57:1245
